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Abstract: Global labor policy through trade has begun to receive growing attention with the 
inclusion of labor provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Until recently there has 
been a shortage of available data that would adequately capture the variation that exists with 
respect to the scope and stringency of labor provisions, preventing scholars and practitioners 
from addressing key questions about the design and effects of the trade-labor linkage. This 
paper introduces a new dataset covering 487 PTAs from 1990 to 2015 coded against 140 
distinct items pertaining to six main categories, presenting – to our knowledge – the most 
rigorous and fine-grained mapping of labor provisions. It also offers the first systematic 
description of key trends in the design and occurrence of those commitments. Our study shows 
that labor provisions have not only expanded in terms of their content and participating 
countries but that labor provisions have, although to a varying degree, also become more 
stringent over time. The provisions that have across all PTAs increased most steadily are the 
ones related to the institutional framework set up for the monitoring and implementation of 




 Policy makers should actively invest in high-quality datasets and quantitative studies 
particularly regarding the socio-economic impact of labor provisions to design better 
targeted and more effective labor provisions in their trade agreements. Such datasets 
also provide a new tool for knowledge sharing and the training of relevant 
constituencies so that they develop a better understanding of existing approaches and 
practices for their ongoing or future trade negotiations. 
 In line with the growing recognition of the importance of ex-post evidence-based 
assessment of the effectiveness of certain mechanisms, policy makers should also 
commit to the inclusion of provisions establishing regular impact assessment of the 
agreed labor provisions and their implementation. 
 While the Singapore Ministerial Declaration (1996) of the WTO designated the ILO 
as the competent body to deal with labor standards in the context of international 
trade, the role of the ILO in this area remains circumscribed. Given its capacities as 
standard setter, provider of technical assistance, and holder of key expertise and 
initiatives in this area, policy makers should consider reinforcing the role of the ILO 
in the trade-labor linkage. 
 Labor provisions in trade agreements have gained momentum in recent years, 
including in countries once staunchly opposed to their introduction, a movement that 
is likely to be reinforced under the UN Sustainable Development Agenda, particularly 
SDG goal 8 on inclusive growth and decent work. In view of the growing 
proliferation of labor provisions and arising new challenges such as parallel 
jurisprudence, institutional overlap, lack of coordination, WTO members should 
consider the renewed discussion and possible introduction of a labor clause at the 
multilateral level. 
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The pendulum is swinging back, but not where the master expected it – and for good 
reason. Since the time Polanyi wrote his masterpiece The Great Transformation (2001 
[1944]), capitalism has gone global again. While domestic labor market liberalization has 
proceeded unabated worldwide in recent decades, international labor regulation has made 
significant progress often beyond the headlines. The trade-labor linkage is a case in point.  
Since the early 1990s, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) increasingly incorporate labor 
provisions (LPs).1 These LPs link the benefits of enhanced market access to, for instance, the 
(effective) enforcement of internationally recognized labor rights. But there is much variation 
across time and space with respect to the scope and stringency of these LPs. While some 
PTAs include far-reaching and highly enforceable LPs, others only make scant or even no 
references to labor standards. 
The objectives of this article are twofold: one is to introduce a new dataset on the 
design of Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements (LABPTA); the other is to document the 
evolution of the content and stringency of these LPs over time. The central idea is to provide 
a detailed and up-to-date picture for the better assessment of the trade-labor nexus on a global 
scale. To our knowledge, LABPTA is the most fine-grained and comprehensive mapping of 
the content of LPs in PTAs, allowing for extended analysis of the design and effects of 
(varying) LPs in PTAs. 
 While researchers have started to focus their attention on explaining the causes and 
consequences of variation in the design of PTAs, LPs have until recently either been 
neglected or not been the focus of systematic investigation (e.g., Dür and Elsig, 2015). 
Existing studies have tended to focus on a single case, be it a particular PTA or global player 
(e.g., Giumelli and van Roozendaal, 2016; Nyland and O’Rourke, 2005), or on a small-N 
comparative analysis of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) (e.g., Hafner-
Burton, 2009; Kerremans and Gistelinck, 2009), all too often using and reproducing the 
narrow statement that US PTAs are enforceable with respect to labor standards whereas EU 
agreements are not (e.g., Postnikov and Bastiaens, 2014), which does not do justice to the 
broadening scope of enforceability in US PTAs and the enforceability, yet with variable 
geometry, of EU PTAs. The first broader based comparative analysis was done by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2009, an assessment that was extended in 
subsequent reports (2013; 2016; 2017). The ILO’s pioneering work in this domain, while 
providing detailed insights into the design and effectiveness of LPs in PTAs, on a 
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methodological basis remains limited in two important ways: on the one hand it fails to 
introduce a comprehensive template for the mapping of LPs in PTAs; on the other hand it 
fails to carry out a systematic coding of the content of LPs in the available largest possible 
number of PTAs based on an integrated and encompassing conceptual and analytical 
approach. 
 Existing mapping exercises tend to focus on LPs as part of a broader objective to map 
nontrade issues (NTIs) in PTAs. Researchers engaged in such endeavor almost invariably 
face a trade-off between breadth and depth of issues covered that comes at the expense of a 
higher level of granularity in the coding of a single issue. Milewicz’s (2016; Milewicz et al., 
2018) dataset codes labor rights alongside human rights, environment, corruption, security 
and democracy for 522 PTAs signed over the period 1951-2009. Milewicz’s mapping of LPs 
carries important limitations not only because it adopts a broad definition of labor rights that 
includes social security rights dealing with sickness, invalidity, old-age, industrial accident 
and unemployment, but also because the coding of the different NTIs, in spite of the 
distinction between provisions in the preamble and the main text of the agreement, remains 
very crude. 
Lechner’s (2016) dataset of NTIs design provides a novel coding for 474 PTAs signed 
since 1990, covering civil and political rights, environmental protection, and economic and 
social rights, the latter category including rights in the realms of development, education, 
health, labor, and social security. It is a significant improvement on Milewicz’s dataset in that 
it covers a range of rights coded over the three dimensions of obligation, precision and 
delegation inherent to the legalization approach (Abbott et al., 2000). Lechner, while using a 
broader definition of LPs than we do, codes 25 items narrowly relating to labor protection 
(substantive-related commitments as well as institution and cooperation-related 
commitments) out of a total of 72 in the economic and social rights category. Yet, her 
template remains limited to the extent that the coding of obligation and delegation (i.e., issues 
of bindingenss, enforeceability, as well as third party involvement) is carried out in relation to 
economic and social rights in general, preventing us from knowing whether obligation and 
delegation apply effectively to LPs. Also, labor-related cooperation commitments are coded 
in a crude fashion with a single category.  
Kamata (2016) examines the impact of labor clauses in PTAs on conditions of work 
for a sample of 223 PTAs from 1995 to 2011. The classification of PTAs with LPs builds on 
two criteria: 1) provisions that demand, urge, or expect the signatory countries to harmonize 
their domestic labor conditions and regulations with the internationally recognized standards; 
4 
 
and 2) provisions that stipulate items over which the signatory countries will cooperate and 
the procedures for dispute settlement on labor issues. While an improvement on the binary 
coding of LPs, his classification remains too rudimentary to adequately capture the large 
variation in the design of LPs in PTAs. Among the shortcomings is the lack of details as to 
whether commitments are specific to any particular standards, the conflation between soft 
and hard mechanisms such as cooperation and enforceability, respectively, and the failure to 
distinguish between various degrees of enforceability.  
Finally, Hofmann et al. (2017) constructed a novel database with detailed 
assessment of the content of 279 PTAs notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
signed between 1958 and 2015. Their mapping covers 52 policy areas with a separate 
category for ʻLabour Market Regulationʼ. It refers to provisions that pertain to the 
regulation of the national labor market and the affirmation of ILO commitments (a single 
item coded in a binary mode), and the enforcement of such provisions (coded on a 0-2 
scale).  In spite of their focus being more specific to labor rights, their methodological 
approach suffers from similar limitations as Kamata’s approach. 
In short, a rigorous and fine-grained approach to mapping LPs in PTAs is overdue. 
Our LABPTA template and dataset provide just that. 
 
2. Conceptualizing and measuring LPs in PTAs 
Given that there is no single approach as to what constitutes a ʻlaborʼ provision in 
PTAs, we opted for a narrow definition which has the advantage of drawing clear distinctions 
between labor and (broader) social provisions on the one hand, and between labor protection 
provisions and (broader) labor market regulation provisions on the other. In our 
conceptualization, LPs refer to rules and regulations that aim to protect and/or promote 
workers’ rights and working conditions. In the context of PTAs, a labor issue is considered to 
be ʻcoveredʼ by an agreement if the agreement contains a provision (i.e., chapter, article, 
paragraph or sentence) providing for some commitment in this field.  In other words, we 
focus on labor protection provisions. Our definition thus excludes provisions dealing with 
social protection, such as social security (e.g., health, old age, unemployment, and family 
benefits) and education policy. It also excludes provisions relating to active labor market 
policies, such as the creation of employment opportunities, training, or ʻsupply-sideʼ 
measures aimed at better matching labor supply and demand. Finally, because our focus is on 
the trade-labor linkage in PTAs, we ignore provisions regarding the free movement of 
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workers and the treatment of migrant workers, as well as labor-related commitments in 
relation to investment. 
 The assessment of coverage, and the elaboration of our coding template for that 
matter, was done in three steps. First, we looked for the presence of LPs by way of the 
traditional search for keywords.2 This initial screening resulted in a classification of PTAs 
into three groups: PTAs with no LPs; PTAs with preambular LPs (or shallow LPs), that is, 
provisions found exclusively under the preamble or objectives parts of PTAs; and PTAs with 
comprehensive LPs, that is, LPs that go beyond the aspirational statements included in the 
preamble or objectives parts of PTAs. We considered LPs in the treaty texts, in side 
agreements on labor and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), without distinction 
between these different sources. However, the main treaty texts should establish a clear 
relationship to side agreements and MoUs for those to be considered. Concerning Action 
Plans that are agreed upon either simultaneously with or after the signing of the PTA 
concerned,3 those sources are considered but careful analysis is required in establishing the 
unilateral or reciprocal nature of the given LPs. 
Second, we manually coded LPs in PTAs against our detailed coding template, which 
we designed using an inductive approach that was informed by the relevant literature. The 
template was fine-tuned as more agreements were added and new provisions found. This was 
a result of a series of exchanges among the authors, one of which is trained as a labor lawyer, 
and between them and a coder, a qualified lawyer with a strong understanding of the 
underlying concepts. We also benefited from several rounds of consultation with an 
established legal expert in international trade law.   
Third, to test the reliability of our coding we crosschecked our results on 13 
overlapping labor-related items from the coding by Lisa Lechner. The average Cohen-Kappa 
across the 13 dimensions is 0.75 (range: 0.63 to 0.88), which is recognized as substantive 
agreement. We are confident about the (high) reliability of our coding given our rigorous 
conceptual approach and efforts to revise it together with the associated coding, a process that 
has spanned over two years. 
Our approach goes beyond existing mapping exercises in two ways. First, for the 
treaty texts we draw on the DESTA dataset (Dür et al., 2014), the most comprehensive of its 
kind in terms of the number of agreements covered on account of including both PTAs that 
have and have not been notified to the WTO. Our dataset contains information on as many as 
140 distinct items pertaining to LPs in 487 PTAs among 165 countries over the period 1990-
2015. To our knowledge, this dataset offers the most comprehensive data available in terms 
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of the number of PTAs, countries and LPs covered. Second, we focus both on the scope (or 
breadth) of LPs, and the stringency of specific provisions through the assessment of their 
enforceability and the institutional framework set up for the monitoring and implementation 
of those.4 
 
3. The LABPTA coding template 
Our coding scheme (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix) is structured around six 
main categories: 1) Aspirational statements relating to LPs in preamble and objectives of the 
agreement (P); 2) Substantive commitments in relation to LPs (S); 3) Obligations in relation 
to substantive LPs (O); 4) Enforceability of the substantive LPs (E); 5) Cooperation 
commitments over LPs (C); and 6) Institutions overseeing the labor-related commitments (I). 
Substance and Cooperation relate to what matters in terms of substantive labor issues 
are being addressed in the relevant legal provisions (Bourgeois et al., 2007). In other words, 
it refers to the scope of labor protection provisions. Obligation, Enforceability and 
Institutions, however, relate to the stringency of labor-related commitments taken in these 
legal provisions. In a sense they qualify how far-reaching specific substantive commitments 
are. Whereas Obligations and Enforceability form the basis for assessing the degree of 
enforceability of specific labor-related commitments, Institutions capture the strength of the 
implementation and available softer means to promote compliance with commitments. 
LPs in the preamble and the objectives parts of the agreements constitute aspirational 
statements, which is why we code them separately. Although still subject of academic debate 
(Hulme, 2016), LPs in preambles are predominantly considered to differ in terms of their 
legal effect from those found in other parts of the agreement in that they do not establish 
specific rights or obligations. Preamble statements do not contain binding obligations upon 
the parties, rather they ʻoffer a context for the signatories’ overall objectives by introducing 
the agreement, setting out the motives of the contracting parties and the objectives to be 
accomplished by the provisions of the statutesʼ (Bourgeois et al. 2007, p. 13). The objective 
to ʻimprove working conditionsʼ is by far the most frequent reference. To avoid double 
counting we do not code under P commitments to labor standards in the preamble if those 
same commitments are reiterated and elaborated in the main body of the agreements (where 
they get coded). 
Under substantive commitments we list items related to international labor standards 
commitments and to domestic law commitments. The former consists of provisions derived 
from or related to internationally recognized labor commitments (fundamental rights at 
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work,5 conditions of work,6 decent work7) and provisions concerning international 
instruments containing such commitments (e.g., ILO Conventions, ILO 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work).8 The latter comprises three types of 
commitments, non-derogation, effective enforcement, and access to domestic courts. Non-
derogation refers to commitments not to encourage trade through the weakening of labor 
laws. Effective enforcement of domestic laws refers to commitments to effectively enforce 
domestic laws. Access to domestic courts refers to guarantees concerning the right of workers 
or employers to fair, equitable and transparent domestic procedures under which their rights 
can be invoked and enforced. In total we have 20 different items coded under S, 17 pertaining 
to international and three to domestic commitments. 
Under Obligations, following a strict legal interpretation of the treaty texts, we code 
the extent of obligations undertaken by the signatory parties. We are interested in whether or 
not the substantive commitments amount to legally binding obligations. Binding obligations 
are indicated by the use of terms such as shall, will, agree, undertake, ensure, realize, whereas 
commitments expressed with words such as ʻshouldʼ or ʻstrive to ensureʼ indicate weaker 
commitments (see Bourgeois et al. 2007, p. 26). The 20 items under Substance are repeated 
under Obligations and coded accordingly. 
Under Enforcement we focus on the model of dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
covering labor-related commitments. Building on a WTO taxonomy (Chase et al., 2016), we 
distinguish between political/diplomatic, quasi-judicial and judicial state-to-state DSM. 
Under the latter two, PTA members have an ʻautomaticʼ right9 of access to (often ad hoc) 
third party adjudication (quasi-judicial DSM) or standing judicial courts (judicial DSM). We 
separately code four types of remedies at the disposal of parties to enforce compliance with 
third party rulings, distinguishing between retaliation measures that can be imposed 
unilaterally, including trade sanctions, monetary compensation, and ʻother appropriate 
measuresʼ, and those that cannot, as when the parties are explicitly required to find a 
ʻconsensualʼ solution to their dispute. The items under substantive commitments are repeated 
under each category of DSM and coded accordingly. Taking the remedies into account, we 
code a total of 64 items under Enforcement. 
Under Cooperation we code the presence of any commitments in relation to 
provisions on labor-related cooperation. This includes the presence of any substantive labor-
related commitments if those are agreed by the parties as issues over which they will 
cooperate. The number of items covered under C (21) is slightly larger than the items under S 
as we found additional issues over which parties can agree to cooperate, including (reform of) 
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labor laws, (promotion of) social dialogue, (reform of) labor administration and inspection 
system, and gender equality.10 
Finally, Institutions depict the attributes that can determine the role and influence the 
institutional arrangements may have in the effective monitoring and implementation of labor-
related commitments. Such attributes include the type of bodies responsible for 
overseeing/implementing the commitments, their operation, the status of participants, the 
involvement of third parties, and the means available for the implementation of agreed 
commitments. We code whether the agreement foresees the establishment of a separate 
specialized committee responsible for the implementation and/or supervision of LPs 
(including contact points) or whether the body responsible for the monitoring/implementation 
of the entire PTA is also in charge of dealing with labor-related provisions (ʻregular 
committeeʼ); whether the agreement stipulates regular meetings of the separate committee or 
whether the committee is convened on an ad hoc basis; whether the officials staffing the 
separate committee are high or low rank officials; whether the agreement authorizes the 
participation of key stakeholders, including the social partners, the ILO, NGOs, or other third 
party organizations; and whether the parties enlist any types of means to carry out their 
cooperation activities. Regarding the latter, we use a threefold distinction, differentiating 
between exchange of information, exchange of people (including study visits, joint research, 
seminars), and capacity building (including technical assistance).  In total, we code 13 items 
under Institution. 
All in all, our LABPTA coding scheme consists of 140 items pertaining to six main 
categories against which we have coded 487 PTAs signed between 1990 and 2015. The 
remaining parts of this paper will document key trends in the incidence and the design of LPs 
in PTAs over time. 
 
4. Trends in the content of LPs in PTAs, 1990-2015 
 
4.1. The rise of LPs in PTAs 
The past 50 years not only witnessed a rapid proliferation in the number of PTAs, but 
also the gradual deepening of those agreements (e.g., Dür and Elsig, 2015). The same trend 
can be observed when assessing LPs in PTAs. Looking at the share of PTAs with LPs in the 
total number of PTAs signed in a given year, the data indicates that compared to an average 
of 32 % in the 1990s, the share rose to 40% during the first decade of the 2000s, reaching an 




Figure 1. Share of PTAs with LPs in total PTAs per year 
 
Note: PTAs with LPs include all agreements with at least one LP. The bars indicate the number of 
newly signed PTA with and without LPs per year.  
 
Such an increase is rather surprising given the failure to adopt a social clause during 
the multilateral trade negotiations in the 1990s due to the opposition of developing countries. 
Until that point the only provision relevant to workers’ rights was an exception to trade 
obligations for measures relating to products of prison labor under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (Art. XX (e)), allowing prohibitions on imports of goods made by such 
labor.  
The past two decades did not only present an increase in the number of PTAs 
including LPs in some form, but there has also been a rise in the adoption of PTAs with 
comprehensive LPs. While the total (cumulative) number of PTAs without or only with 
shallow LPs still surpasses the number of PTAs with comprehensive LPs, a steady increase in 
the pace of adoption of such PTAs can be observed in conjunction with the plateauing of 
shallow (and no LP) PTAs (Figure 2). In 2009, for the first time, more PTAs with LPs were 
adopted than PTAs without LPs, a trend that continued in subsequent years (with the 
exception of 2011 and 2015). Moreover, since 2006 trade partners have also predominantly 
opted for the adoption of PTAs with comprehensive LPs rather than shallow LPs (again with 




Figure 2. Cumulative number of PTAs with no LP, shallow LPs, and comprehensive LPs 
 
 
Breaking down PTAs by the level of development of its members and by broad types 
of LPs,11 the data shows that the highest share of PTAs with any kind of LPs are signed 
between countries from the North while the highest share of PTAs with comprehensive LPs 
are signed between countries from the North and the South, highlighting potential 
protectionist motivations, but also genuine concerns for worker protection, by Northern 
countries in the introduction of LPs in North-South PTAs (Figure 3.A). In contrast, the 
majority of PTAs without any LPs are signed among countries in the South, having also the 
smallest share of agreements signed with comprehensive LPs. Interestingly, North-North 
PTAs have the largest share of PTAs with shallow LPs, followed by North-South and South-
South PTAs (Figure 3.B).   
 
Figure 3. Distribution of PTAs by level of development of its members and broad types of 
trade-labor linkages (1990-2015) 
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Exploring the data disaggregated by regions, the highest average number of PTAs 
with LPs are signed by Developed Economies and the members of the EU,12 followed by 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and then, surprisingly, countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Figure 4). Despite the recent surge in PTAs – having tripled over the period 
of a single decade (Asian Development Bank, 2013) – Asia continues to fall behind other 
regions. Focusing on PTAs with comprehensive LPs, however, the East- and South-East Asia 
together with the Pacific region performs better than the Middle East and North Africa or the 
(non-EU) Central and South-Easter European and Commonwealth of Independent States, 
irrespective that such regions in total have more PTAs with LPs. This is, in part, explained by 
the comparatively late engagement with LPs in the region, resulting in a ʻjumpʼ of the 
generation of PTAs in which LPs are predominantly addressed in the preamble.  
 








































Note: The disaggregation follows the classification of the ILO (2014) 
 
Delving into country-level data (Figure 5), the countries with the highest number of 
PTAs with LPs over 1990-2015 are the EFTA member states, followed by the EU-15 (i.e., 
countries that joined the EU pre-2004), and the Eastern European countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 (i.e., EU-10 countries). Among the countries with the highest number of PTAs 
with LPs are also the US, Canada and New Zealand, while from the South are Latin 
American countries, such as Chile, Peru and Colombia. Regarding the number of PTAs with 
comprehensive LPs (figure not shown), the picture is different: countries topping the list are 
the EU-15, followed by the US, the EU-10 , Chile, Canada, South Korea, Colombia and New 
Zealand, with the EFTA member states only afterward. It is worth noting that the results are 
in part driven by the numerous agreements signed between EU member states and 
prospective candidate countries prior to their accession to the Union. 
 
































Note: The grey color in the map denotes countries that have not yet signed any PTA with LPs. To 
maintain the color distinction between countries that have not yet signed any PTA with LPs and 
countries that have signed PTA(s) with LP(s) the system takes the lowest value for countries that 
signed a PTA with LP(s) as the minim value for the scaling (i.e., 1). 
 
When considering the average number of LPs across all PTAs signed by a given 
country over 1990-2015, the picture is different (Figure 6). As the map shows, the countries 
with the highest averages include the US and Canada (together with Georgia and Taiwan), 
followed predominantly by Latin American countries (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Panama, El Salvador and Colombia), South-Korea and the EU-10. While much of 
this is determined by the combination of the extent of ʻPTA activismʼ and the time countries 
start to engage with PTAs with LPs, one can nevertheless see that North American countries 
exceed the EU when it comes to the average number of LPs in their respective PTAs. 
 




Note: see Figure 5. 
 
 
4.2. Types of LPs in PTAs 
Looking at the types of provisions included in PTAs with comprehensive LPs over the 
period of 1990-2015, on average most provisions concern the institutional framework set up 
for the monitoring and implementation of LPs in PTAs. This is closely followed by 
provisions concerning substantive commitments and those concerning cooperation 
commitments. However, only about half of the substance-related commitments are 
formulated as obligations and even fewer are enforceable through at least one of the three 
coded DSMs (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Average number of provisions per main category 
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Note: the average number of provisions per category was calculated based on the sum of all items 
coded under a given category of LPs per PTA and averaged across all PTAs with comprehensive LPs. 
To balance out the fact that different categories have different number of items coded under it (see 
above), we weighted the average number of provisions per category against a total of 21, the number 
of items listed under C. 
 
As to the change in the share of PTAs with a given LP type in the total number of 
signed PTAs for five- to six-year windows, the largest increase between the first (1990-1995) 
and the last (2011-2015) window took place in relation to the adoption of institution-related 
LPs (39 percentage points, from 3.1% to 42.2%; Figure 8.F). This is closely followed not 
only by the increase in the share of PTAs with substance-related LPs (38.3 percentage point 
increase over the same time frame, from 8.4% to 46.7%; Figure 8.B), but also, at a very 
similar rate, the share of PTAs with obligatory commitments (37.7 percentage points, from 
2.3% to 40%; Figure 8.C) and enforceable commitments (36.1 percentage points, from 8.4% 
to 44.4%; Figure 8.D), indicating a shift in the core design of LPs with an increasing 
emphasis on the bindingness and accountability of such commitments.  
 
Figure 8. Share of LP types in total PTAs per five-year windows 
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C. Share of PTAs with Obligation LPs D. Share of PTAs with Enforcement LPs 
        
E. Share of PTAs with Cooperation LPs    F. Share of PTAs with Institution LPs 
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Although on average cooperation-related provisions are among the most frequently 
agreed commitments, comparatively speaking, a lower increase took place in the share of 
PTAs with cooperation-related LPs (25.6 percentage points between 1990-1995 and 2011-
2015, from 9.9% to 35.6%; Figure 8.E). This can be partly explained by the more frequent 
and early use of such provisions in the EU PTAs signed with post-communist Eastern 
European States. 
A closer examination of the substance- and cooperation-related commitments reveals 
that signatory parties have a different approach in the areas they wish to cover by such 
provisions. Substance-related commitments are dominated by the ILO 1998 Declaration and 
the related principles and rights on freedom of association and collective bargaining, the 
elimination of forced labor, the abolition of child labor and the elimination of discrimination 
in respect of employment and occupation (Figure 9.A). However, the provisions trade 
partners most frequently commit to relate to domestic law commitments, namely the effective 
enforcement of their laws and non-derogation. Under cooperation, the key focus – besides the 
most frequently noted health and safety commitments – is the improvement of the existing 
framework and practice of social dialogue and the strengthening of the labor administration 
and the inspection system (Figure 9.B).  
 
Figure 9. Frequency of substance- and cooperation-related issues 
A. Substance-related issues       B. Issues covered by cooperation 
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Regarding the distribution of the three types of DSMs, on average the use of political 
DSM is still agreed two times more often than the arbitration based quasi-judicial DSM 
(Figure 10). Resorting to judicial DSM remains a rare feature of PTAs and mainly of those 
that besides regulating trade relations also establish a broader economic area (African 
Economic Community 1991, European Economic Area 1992, East African Community 1999) 
or common market (East African Common Market 2009). In a similar vein, the remedies that 
require consensus among the parties are the ones most frequently included in PTAs (46% of 
all PTAs with comprehensive LPs) while the unilateral retaliation measures ʻother 
appropriate measuresʼ, monetary compensation, and trade sanctions are agreed in fewer PTAs 
(36%, 24% and 17% of all PTAs with comprehensive LPs, respectively). 
 
Figure 10. Average number of provisions relating to dispute settlement mechanisms 
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Note: the average number of provisions was calculated based on the sum of all items coded under 
political, quasi-judicial and judicial DSM per PTA and averaged across all PTAs with comprehensive 
LPs. 
 
As discussed earlier, one significant change has been the rise of institution-related 
provisions. An interesting development in this regard is the increase in the involvement of 
third parties (social partners, ILO, NGOs, other third parties) (Figure 11). The inclusion of 
social partners and other third parties have progressively been recognized as an important 
element in the monitoring and implementation of LPs in PTAs – especially with the adoption 
of the EU’s last generation of PTAs starting with EU – South Korea (2010). The participation 
of third parties has either been institutionalized through the establishment of an external 
permanent committees, such as the National Advisory Committee for Labor Provisions of US 
Free Trade Agreements operating under the US Department of Labor, or through mechanisms 
established within the PTA, such as the EU’s Domestic Advisory Groups and the Civil 
Society Forum. The majority of references concern ʻother third partiesʼ, closely followed by 
social partners and then NGOs. While the Singapore Ministerial Declaration (1996) 
designated the ILO as the competent body to deal with international labor standards in the 
context of international trade, reference to the ILO remains the least frequently mentioned 
provision and primarily relates to cooperation activities. Only in few cases may the parties 
seek advice from the ILO: no such role is granted to the ILO in US PTAs, while in Canadian 
PTAs the involvement of the ILO is limited to the panel selection procedures. It is only in the 
recently signed EU PTAs that the parties may seek advice of the ILO for the resolution of 
their disputes. 
 





Note: The secondary axis depicts the number of PTAs with reference to any third party inclusion over 
the five-year windows. 
 
4.3. Stringency of LPs in PTAs 
To further document the increase in the stringency of LPs over time, we develop two 
new measures, one for each of our two dimensions of stringency: strong enforcement and 
deep institutional LPs. Strong enforcement is defined through the simultaneous coding of 
quasi-judicial or judicial DSM and any of the following three unilateral sanctions: other 
appropriate measures, monetary compensation or trade sanctions. Deep institution is defined 
as the combination of a separate body established specifically for the monitoring and 
implementation of LPs and the inclusiveness of the institutional mechanism, that is, the 
involvement of any third parties in the monitoring and implementation of the agreements. 
Looking at the share of such provisions in the total number of signed PTAs for each of the 
five windows, the data shows that the use of either of those concepts showed a more modest 
increase over time compared to provisions described earlier (Figure 12.A-B).  
 
Figure 12. Share of PTAs with strong enforcement and deep institutions LPs in total PTAs 
per five-year windows 
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New provisions related to strong enforcement were more prevalent in the early 1990s 
than those related to deep institutions, a trend that has reversed in recent years: while the deep 
institutional framework was not used during the 1990s, such provisions grew more rapidly 
than strong enforcement provisions from the early 2000s onwards (Figure 13.A). This 
variation is partly explained by the large number of PTAs signed by the EU with Central- and 
East-European countries in the 1990s, providing not only for arbitration-based DSM 
regarding – rather narrow types of – LPs, but also the possibility for the use of ʻother 
appropriate measuresʼ as sanctions in case of non-compliance. On the other hand, the US did 
not sign any PTA in the last five-year window, resulting in the lower number of PTAs with 
strong enforcement in that period. Regarding the distribution of such provisions by the level 
of development of PTAs members, the data indicates that the majority of PTAs with such 
provisions belong to the North-North and North-South agreements, while they continue to be 
a rather rare feature of South-South agreements (Figure 13.B). Interestingly, while strong 
enforcement is more often present in North-North PTAs compared to deep institutions, the 
opposite holds in South-South PTAs. 
 
Figure 13. Strong enforcement and deep institutions 
A. Rise over time      B. By type of level of development   
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4.4. LPs in PTAs by key players 
The actors that have largely shaped the design of LPs in PTAs are the US and the EU. 
As noted above, while the EU has since the early 1990s signed more PTAs with LPs than the 
US, on average the US continues to have a higher number of LPs included in its PTAs with 
comprehensive LPs (Figure 14). The trend has started to change with the introduction of the 
EU’s last generation of PTAs in 2010 (Figure 14.A).13 Regarding the specific design, 
previous literature sums up the key differences by suggesting that the US uses a hard-law 
while the EU uses a soft-law approach. While it is true that the US applies overall a more 
stringent approach to LPs in PTAs, the difference between the two approaches are more 
subtle than previous studies indicated. On the one hand, obligation- and enforcement-related 
provisions are not absent from EU PTAs. On the other hand, US PTAs continue to include on 
average more cooperation-related provisions than EU PTAs (Figure 14.B). That said, with 
two exceptions (US-Jordan 2000 and US-Australia 2004), all US PTAs with LPs include the 
possibility to unilaterally impose both trade sanctions and monetary fines, whereas ʻother 
appropriate measuresʼ is the only available unilateral remedy in (some) EU PTAs.   
 
Figure 14. LPs in US and EU signed PTAs 
A. Average number of LPs per five-year windows B. Average number of LPs per main 
categories (cumulated over 1990-2015) 
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Canada and New Zealand, albeit the latter only since the early 2000s, also belong to 
the main drivers of the trade-labor linkage. Here a more pronounced difference can be 
identified: while Canadian PTAs with comprehensive LPs follow a stringent design for LPs 
with high averages both in terms of obligation/enforcement and cooperation-related 
provisions, such PTAs signed by New Zealand are shallower but they embody an ideal-
typical soft approach, more so than the EU, with predominantly non-binding and non-
enforceable LPs (Figure 15.B). Interestingly, the types of provisions which do not show 
significant differences between the two countries are those related to the institutional 
framework. Comparing Canada with the EU or the US, however, the data shows that Canada 
has on average a higher number of LPs (especially with respect to substance, obligation and 
enforcement) (Figure 14-15). Canada’s more progressive approach is also corroborated by its 
recent proposal of a more ambitious approach to advancing labor rights under the NAFTA 
renegotiations.14 One interesting aspect of Canadian PTAs with comprehensive LPs is that 
they only allow for monetary sanctions (with the exception of Canada-Costa Rica 2001) but 
not trade sanctions.15 
 
Figure 15. LPs in PTAs signed by Canada and New Zealand 
A. Average number of LPs per five-year windows B. Average number of LPs per main 






















Regarding the stringency of LPs, as Figure 16 indicates the US and Canada negotiated 
LPs with strong enforcement provisions in all of their PTAs, and with deep institutions in all 
but one of their PTAs (US-Jordan 2000 and Canada-Costa Rica 2001). The EU offers a more 
varying picture with more PTAs including strong enforcement than deep institutions 
provisions. As noted above, this is mainly explained by the enforcement provisions included 
in PTAs signed during the 1990s with candidate countries, a design that is also found in some 
of the more recent EU PTAs (e.g., CARIFORUM-EC 2008). The increase in deep institutions 
relates mainly to the design of last generation agreements. By contrast, in the case of New 
Zealand, while none of the PTAs signed so far includes provisions pertaining to strong 
enforcement, almost all PTAs provide not only for a separate committee but also for the 
inclusion of third parties. 
 























4.5. LPs in South-South PTAs 
Throughout the past decades, and particularly since the early 2000s, countries from 
the South have also embarked on the introduction of LPs in the PTAs signed among 
themselves, although these agreements continue to remain rather limited in terms of their 
scope and stringency.16 The most noticeable increase in the average number of LPs took 
place during the last window (Figure 17.A) with the majority of those relating to cooperation 
or the institutional framework (Figure 17.B). 
 
Figure 17. LPs in PTAs signed by countries from the South 
A. Average number of LPs per-five-year windows  B. Average number of LPs per main 
categories (cumulated over 1990-2015) 
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In terms of the stringency of PTAs with LPs signed between countries from the South, 
our coding shows that none of those agreements contain strong enforcement provisions and 
only 4 out of the 9 PTAs with comprehensive LPs provide for deep institutions (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 1993, Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) revised 2001, China-Peru 2009 and Colombia-Panama 2013) – leaving these 
agreements with LPs the least stringent ones. 
 
4.6. Comparing trends between LABPTA and other datasets 
Considering conceptual differences, the comparative assessment across the various 
data remains limited. Importantly, among existing mappings, only the data constructed by 
Hofmann et al. (2017) is available. Regarding the period of 1990-2015, their dataset has 257 
PTAs. Comparing LPs across the two datasets is challenging, especially for enforceability. 
The authors do not provide detailed coding manual and concepts used for the construction of 
the dataset, including what labor market provisions entail, are left without definitions. 
Enforceability is coded on a 0-2 scale with 1 if the language used in the PTA is sufficiently 
precise and committing and 2 if provisions concerned have not been excluded from DSM 
procedures under the PTA. A key drawback of their method is that it fails to explain what 
type of DSMs are considered for the coding and neglects the role of the different sanctions 
agreed upon by trade partners.  
In any case, the two datasets point to similarities and differences in results.17 Out of 
the 257 PTAs, labor market regulation was coded in 67 PTAs (26% of all PTAs). Taking 

















higher than under LABTA (17%). Looking at changes in the share of PTAs with labor market 
regulation in the total number of PTAs signed in a given year, the Hofmann et al. data shows 
a similar trend as described under Figure 1: compared to an average of 8% in the 1990s, the 
share rose to 26% during the first decade of the 2000s, reaching an average of 52% during the 
period of 2010-2015 (with a peak of 86% in 2014). Regarding enforceability, out of the 67 
PTAs, in 19 PTAs (28%) LPs are legally enforceable but excluded from the DSM, while in 
27 PTAs (40%) LPs are legally enforceable and covered by DSM, indicating a similar degree 
of enforceability with LABPTA (22% and 42%, respectively, of all PTAs with 
comprehensive LPs; when equating Hofmann et al.’s variables of enforceability with LPs that 
are binding and subject only to political DSM, on the one hand, and LPs that are binding and 
subject only to quasi-judicial and/or judicial DSM, on the other hand). Looking at change 
over time, while under Hofmann et al. there is a decrease in the share of PTAs with 
provisions that are enforceable and covered by DSM (from 80% during 1990-1995 to 20% in 
2011-2015), under LABPTA LPs that are binding and covered by quasi-judicial and/or 
judicial DSM are on the rise until 2010 (from 23% during 1990-1995 to 54% in 2006-2010) 
only after which there is a decrease (32% in 2011-2015). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Discussions regarding the role and effectiveness of LPs have over the past decade 
intensified among scholars and practitioners, particularly with the negotiation of the now 
defunct (?) mega-regional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the 
Transatlantic Traded and Investment Partnership. The primary goal of the paper was to 
introduce a brand new dataset on LPs in PTAs (LABPTA) and to offer a detailed and up-to-
date description of the design of existing provisions. By providing a fine-grained approach to 
the mapping of LPs in PTAs the dataset allows for a better assessment of the trade-labor 
nexus on a global scale both for researchers, policy makers and practitioners – a contribution 
that has become much timely with the 2017 US elections, the ongoing Brexit negotiations or 
even the possible renegotiation of previously signed PTAs. 
Among the main findings derived from the descriptive analysis is a twofold trend: on 
the one hand, LPs in PTAs are in general becoming more stringent (with more binding and 
enforceable provisions) mainly as a result in the design adopted by key trade players such as 
the US, Canada and the EU; on the other hand, evidence also indicates for the continuation of 
less stringent provisions (with few binding and even fewer enforceable provisions), 
particularly by actors that more recently started to incorporate LPs in their trade agreements 
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(i.e., New Zealand, EFTA or countries from the South signing PTAs among themselves). 
However, one key commonality is the increased emphasis put on the institutional framework 
responsible for the monitoring and implementation of LPs in PTAs, resulting – although to a 
different degree – in more inclusive and specialized institutions. 
With the NAFTA renegotiations and the EU’s renewed debate on Trade and 
Sustainable Development, the design of LPs in PTAs has yet again come to the fore.  In both 
cases trade unions are pushing for the broadening of the scope of issues incorporated in PTAs 
and for more efficient, sanctions-based DSMs to ʻfacilitate transition to upward convergence 
to establish common ground for fair and just trade between countriesʼ.18 Such demands 
gained momentum in light of the ruling handed down in the US-Guatemala case where the 
dispute panel found that the litigants could not prove that the violations were trade-related 
and hence actionable under the agreement. Proposals are also made to move beyond the 
narrowly defined working conditions (e.g., working time, minimum wage) and to tie those 
commitments to internationally defined standards instead of committing countries to enforce 
their own national laws on those issues. In the European Commission’s 15-point plan to make 
EU trade and sustainable development chapters more effective (February 2018),19 the EU 
committed to ʻcontinue to include commitments on the effective occupational health and 
safety and labour inspection system in line with international standardsʼ, indicating a higher 
degree of commitment but without the actual expansion of the issues covered. 
At the same time, with the expansion of countries agreeing to LPs in their PTAs, 
particularly those from the South (but also with the increasing convergence in the scope of 
LPs), the reintroduction of the trade-labor linkage in the WTO’s agenda could be seen as a 
possible avenue for the future of labor governance through trade. Although in the 2001 Doha 
Ministerial Declaration20 the WTO reaffirmed its position adopted in Singapore, the growing 
references and commitments in PTAs to LPs might create space for the reopening of the 
discussion. While their might be arguments against putting LPs on the Doha Round’s already 
intricate and slowly moving agenda, it might also provide a bargaining chip for developing 
countries to help break the deadlock of the Doha Round. Looking at the large emerging 
economies, China has already signed four PTAs with LPs (with Chile, New Zealand, Peru 
and Switzerland), while Brazil and India, who have not signed any PTAs with LPs, are 
currently both in negotiation with the EU and EFTA. Despite India being among the key 
countries objecting to the social clause during the 1990s, current available reports no longer 
indicate that the inclusion of LPs would constitute a remaining obstacle in the negotiations. 
The same holds for Brazil.  
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In choosing between existing designs, one of the key challenges faced by policy 
makers has been the limitations in quantitative research on the effectiveness of LPs. At the 
core of this has been the lack of available data on LPs in PTAs. While our hope is to fill this 
gap, limitations to our method should be acknowledged: on the one hand, the binary coding 
does not always allow for nuanced distinction between varying scopes of the same 
commitment across different PTAs;21 on the other hand, our scope-driven approach to DSM 
leaves out important procedural features that – as the US-Guatemala case presents – can be 
decisive in the settlement of labor-related disputes. Subject of future discussion is the 
possible weighting of our items, all of which is treated now as equally weighted. Finally, 
given that it is intrinsic to such provisions to evolve over time, inclusion of additional items 
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1 PTAs are agreements liberalizing trade between two or more countries without extending this liberalization to 
all countries. 
2 Search keywords used are: labour, labor, employ, work, strike, social, ILO, right, disrim, health, capacity, 
training, education, equal, equality, poverty and safeguard. 
3 For example the Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (April 2011) adopted in relation to the U.S. - 
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (2006). 
4 Horn et al. (2010) differentiate between coverage (or scope) and legal enforceability. 
5 Fundamental rigts refer to the principles and rights in four categories, as defined by the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work adopted in 1998: freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of forced or compulsory labor; the abolition of 
child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
6 We code provisions related to working conditions (generic category if the content of the conditions of work is 
unspecified), working time, wages, and health and safety. 
7 Although not defined in PTAs, reference to decent work encompasses the four pillars identified by the ILO as 
essential to the promotion and achievement of decent work: social dialogue, social protection, employment 
creation, and international labor standards. 
8 We also code references to corporate social responsibility (CSR) under international labor standards 
commitments when those are noted specifically in relation to LPs. Exception to this rule is our coding of 
references to CSR in the preamble which are by nature formulated in a more general manner. 
9 That is, PTA members have no right to veto a referral to third party adjudication. 
10 Domestic law commitments are not coded under C by design (i.e., implementation in the other parties’ 
country is not an option). We also did not find such provisions. 
11 The classification of countries is based on the World Bank’s 2017 Country and Lending Groups classification. 
We considered high-income countries to belong to the North and middle- and low-income countries to the 
South. High-income countries that are not OECD members include: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Hong Kong, Kuwait, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Macao, Malta, Monaco, Oman, Palau, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay. 
12 For the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) we used the average number of PTAs with LPs 
across their member states. 
13 Should the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP 2016) be included, the US with 90 items coded under the TPP 
would have still preceded the EU in the last five-year window – although to a noticeably lesser extent. 
14 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-nafta-negotiators-can-do-about-worker-anxiety 
15 Should the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA 2016) be included, it would count among 
the exceptions.  
16 South-South PTAs with comprehensive LPs are: African Economic Community 1991; Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa 1993; Economic Community Of West African States 1993; Eurasian Economic 
Community 1999; East African Community 1999; Caribbean Community 2001; China Peru 2009; East African 
Common Market 2009; Colombia Panama 2013. 
17 Given that Hofmann et al. (2017) use the year of the ‘entry into force’, we re-matched their PTAs with the 
DESTA’s ‘year of signing’, the dates LABPTA is based on. 
18 ETUC Resolution for an EU progressive trade and investment policy (June 2017): 
https://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-resolution-eu-progressive-trade-and-investment-policy-adopted-
executive-committee#.WhsQ3kqnE2w; see also https://aflcio.org/statements/written-comments-how-make-
nafta-work-working-people  
19 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1803 
20 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm  
21 In the Canada-Chile (1996) PTA, quasi-judicial DSM is not available for the parties on the effective 
enforcement of domestic laws in general, but only should the effective enforcement concern “occupational 
safety and health, child labour or minimum wage technical labour standards” (Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation, Art. 25 (1)). 
                                                          
